Euthanasia the act of killing someone painlessly, especially to relieve an incurable illness.

Geoffrey Hamilton

April 4, 1995

Like one of the four horsemen of the apocalypse euthanasia sweeps across the countryside with his brothers suicide, abortion, and capital punishment to plague the world with uncertainty. This moral issue has many variables but resides between the two extremes of, "all human life must be preserved at all costs", to "at some point in one's life there comes an advantageous time to die and it should be allowed by law to be prompted by oneself, or when that is not possible, by others". The second extreme has the strongest case.

Given that there are legitimate moral issues and euthanasia is one, which is the way to approach it? First one must recognize that moral issues are value issues; otherwise one might be discussing how best to turn thumb screws. The values at odds in euthanasia are between that of life and that of living. Is the important factor the sanctity of life itself, or is it meaningful choices in the face of life?

If one were to believe that the former is the important approach, that human life should not be differentiated by claims that one life is less meaningful than others, even by the possessor of that life, then it remains to be proven.

If a proof for the claim was made that the intrinsic value of life is a priori, that would be absurd, for what can possibly precede experience except genetic programming.

If it was the case that we inherited genetically a high value for human life, one that made all people equal in value, then within us all would be a automatic prohibition from hurting and killing ourselves and others, and no court or justice system would be necessary. The claim of an intrinsic, and somehow therefore equal, value to life must then be due to experience.

First, would that conclusion include the premise that we hold as equal to others our own life? Never. If all life is intrinsically equal in value and a situation arises where you are faced with imminent death from a certain man, and you can kill him first with a gun, is it a toss up as to which life is more valuable - your's or his? Of course not. If his value is intrinsic then the fact that this man has already killed ten other people cannot reduce that value. It remains undecidable who should live and die.

Conversely, if you are ninety years old, sick of life and about to die of cancer, and a twelve year old boy is next to you in the hospital, also with cancer, and there is only enough of a drug treatment for one patient to fight the cancer, is it a toss up as to who's life should be saved by the treatment? The problem with the intrinsic value of life theory is that existence is full of contingencies which make us sense value as relative to other things. And because, on occasion, we cannot avoid choosing between different things the contingencies mitigate or enhance all values, even the most important values we posses.

Even if life is not intrinsically valuable, a second problem arises if life itself is claimed to be more valuable than living. This claim would need to be contingent on one's ability to make life itself more valuable than living. To answer that question one must find the answer to another question, what is life and what is living? Is life the beating of the heart? Is this it's essence? Considering how it is possible to live without one's heart and yet live essentially the same as before the heart was removed then it can't be the heart. In fact every body part except one can be removed or replaced without changing the persons essence.

That lone body part is the brain, the only part capable of creating value. This single point of the body is then the only way that value for oneself and others is created. If one is brain dead and the torso is made to continue to pump blood, is this being alive? No. Something is necessary within the brain's activity which constitutes its actual life, it is found in the act of living. That essence, that something, is 'free will', or the faculty people have to act in there own interests in the face of the contingent world. This 'free will' weighs one's contingent values against the other contingencies of the world and acts in one's own interests. Because, when the interests and values are contingent, then no two experiences can have the same exact value.

Life, then, like all that we experience, is not valued consistently except as a subservient aspect of the process of living. Living is the activity of the mind, within the brain, which creates for itself the value of itself and others in a contingent world. Without 'free will' it cannot create value in response to the contingencies of ongoing existence. If 'free will' did not operate, and value was inherited and intrinsic, a value might lead us to ignore the dangers of the world's contingent aspect and like lemmings we might all fall into the sea, or worse. However this process of 'free will' is in competition with other 'free wills'. (Competition is part of the contingency of the world.) Hence when someone 'free wills' a value in their death and our 'free will' creates a value toward that act, which does not think it valuable, we can react. We can think it bad, or we can meet with others who agree with us, then make it difficult for people with opposing values to commit to that value of death.

But given that value only comes to one because of the ability one has to act with a 'free will', then those competing 'free wills' which attempt to restrict that ability to create value are in fact acting to reduce value in the world. It is only in the restriction of 'free will' that a particular 'free willed' value is less valuable in the world.

If we then use this abstract conclusion toward the issue of euthanasia, we come to see how a moral issue, an issue concerned with values, is not one of 'a priori ' fact, or of genetic programming, or one of universal values, or of common cause, but it is an issue concerning the individual's ability to create value for him or herself. If one creates a value for one's own death, while others for there own life these may become contingencies in relation to each others world, but their created values can be maintained without conflict. If either extends the value they hold by preventing the other from fulfilling his or her value than this is where there is a wrong done. Any attempt to prevent the values of other people from being fulfilled is an attempt to eliminate value. This concept even applies if the value is short sighted. Only the experience of the contingency (a mistake) will actually make the alternatives valuable.

In the practical application of this concept toward euthanasia, a law should be passed which allows unrestricted access to the means of death, for those who value this avenue. To those unable to commit the act needed to bring about their death then assistance should be allowed to occur (not be required by any person). This assistance should be asked for orally or in writing. To formalize the process, the back of a drivers license, beside the organ donors box, should be a 'consent to terminate one's life' box, if one becomes unable to consent to euthanasia. This consent is an act of 'free will'. If no prior consent is given to terminate a life then this route of terminating the life must not be taken. But, as in the case of brain dead people, when there is no chance for a revival of the ability to consent, than a panel of doctors, in consultation with the next of kin, should be allowed to decide to terminate the life. This is if a reasonable assumption can be made that no further meaningful life, or living, is possible - that no further 'free will' can be exercised. Some might argue that if one is incapable of voicing the consent to die, then those in charge must err on the side of caution. This is correct, but as long as it seems impossible for the patient to ever arrive at a state where consent can be given, the cautious approach is to terminate the life. First, to prolong the life could be tortuous; second, there is no chance to exercise 'free will' ever again so others must take control of the patient's interests; and third, those interests seem like nil to those with power of attorney.

This entire argument requires an acceptance that morality exists, because if morality does not exist then anything goes. However if one consents to acknowledge that ethical and moral issues exist than living itself has a stronger value than life itself. Therefore euthanasia should be governed by a 'free will's' attempt to create value by acting in its own best interests in a contingent world. When that 'free will' can act for itself no longer, then a wider society should recognize that the individual is unable to act out its capacity to create value. In this case, society can recognize that the individual's value for his or her self is nil. This should direct society to end that life on the individual's behalf.

When the other three horsemen of the apocalypse pass by again it would be comforting to believe that a similar argument to this one might end their plagues of uncertainty. (05/04/95)