The Lawmakers
Exegesis
Geoffrey Hamilton
April 14, 1998
Part I
The Emperor Claudius has been a fascinating figure to me
from the time of the first airing of the BBC's I Claudius back in
the 1970s. I could not understand why someone, who was so
disrespected, could suddenly be placed in a position of great
power, then, after ruling relatively well, still be considered an
idiot by many historians. Graves addressed these issues by
drawing a full and favourable portrait of Claudius in his books,
which of course led to the show. However, I did not feel that
Graves was able to account for Claudius' strangest actions in
terms of motivation or rational.
Barbara Levick, Arnoldo Momigliano and Vincent Scramuzza,
also dealt with similar concerns regarding Claudius, but I feel
they did not address them sufficiently. Scramuzza was
concerned about approving of Claudius and so dealt with ethical
points which would show Claudius in a good light: for example,
regarding Claudius' liberal attitudes towards law and legislation.
Momigliano and Levick vary in there own needs to approve of Claudius,
but neither addresses his basic philosophy. Specifically, Levick says
that there is no evidence of Claudius'
interest in philosophy as only one philosopher resided at court,
Claudius Balbillus. Looked at differently, this is evidence that
the Emperor took an interest in Philosophy because Balbillus resided
at court. Related to this, Claudius mentions how a certain Barbillus
advises him in a matter of policy. If it is the same man, it
demonstrates that some value was attached to philosophers.
In addition, Levick also states that Cicero was influential with Claudius,
but was misinterpreted . Cicero is a philosophical writer and is
acknowledged to be influential to Claudius' rule, which is significant.
Also we are told by Suetonius that Claudius defended Cicero in "a very
learned work", so this is confirmation that Claudius had a large degree
of familiarity with Cicero, and so some degree of philosophical inquiry
was taking place.
Regarding Levick's charge of misinterpretation on Claudius' part, it
is possible that Claudius was not a blind imitator of Cicero and saw
occasion to use the promptings of Cicero's works as the opportunity to
elaborate in his own way. This accounts for the, so called,
misinterpretation.
Additionally, if one considers how Claudius is careful in his edicts and
letters to look into the background of every nuance of an issue about
which he is concerned, it would
not be unusual of him to have read the body of Cicero's writings
with a mind to comprehending the writer he planned to defend --
publicly and on paper. Also, Cicero wrote and alluded to the works of a
great number of Greek and Roman philosophers, and he critiqued the ideas
contained within. Claudius, consistent with his studious behavior, may
have also investigated Cicero's
sources. Claudius, as a skilled historian, and leading Roman all
his life, would have been proficient at assessing the surviving ancient
texts mentioned by Cicero and would have had all texts available to him
at his request, such texts as are not available today. Finally, there
is the word of Seneca, in his consolation of Polybius, that Claudius
was indeed
well read in philosophy: "...by reason of his most retentive memory he
has already presented you all the examples which could bring your mind
to a state of equanimity; with
habitual eloquence he has already set before you the precepts of
all the sages". Even if the evident
flattery forces one to discount some of the elements in this letter,
there is no cogent reason to deny that Seneca accepts that Claudius
was well read in philosophy.
Now, I will discuss the philosophy of Claudius in relation to the
philosophies available to him in his day. Overall, I have come to
the conclusion that Claudius used Cicero as a model, but that Claudius
was consistently a radical Sceptic, and originated new understandings
of Scepticism through a fascination with games, including dice and the
circus.
Robert Graves in Claudius the God, seems to preempt my opinion with his
own. He puts in Claudius' mouth the words, "I am neither a Sceptic nor
particularly superstitious. I love ancient forms and ceremonies and have
an inherited belief in the old Roman Gods which I refuse to subject to
any philosophical analysis." I will deal with his Scepticism last
and will start with a discussion
of his superstitions.
Graves' view seems to be based on Claudius' acknowledged use
of the auspices and the other religious rites of a superstitious
nature, and secondly on the lack of any overt indication of a
criticism of those ideas within a philosophical context. I agree
that Claudius performed many religious rituals and gave many
indications of following superstitious Roman and Hellenistic ideas.
I also agree that he did not openly question these beliefs. But
this is still consistent with a Sceptical philosophical outlook
as the Sceptics did not object to their own
participation in conventions and they actively pursued them when
society dictated. With this point made clear now I will show why
Claudius' use of the rites shows he is not likely to be
connected to some of the other major philosophical schools of his
age.
The first ancient philosophy that should be eliminated is Epicurianism.
This philosophy, which Cicero was sympathetic to and which Cassius,
Virgil and Horace followed, was a strict dogma with many wavering
Roman followers. The doctrine forbade the practice of superstitious
rites and even one's participation in
government or in any kind of political activity. Obviously,
Claudius participated in these ways, but his lack of adherence to
this principal would not preclude him from this philosophy entirely.
He could still have used it as part of an eclecticism. However, this
too is unlikely. The main Epicurian doctrine
regarding pleasure would not have appealed readily to Claudius.
Claudius was well known to be hedonistic regarding drinking,
food, gambling, love and sex, but Epicurians were hedonistic in a
very different way. Pleasure was the absence of pain and so excessive
pleasures were avoided because
of the pain which excess eventually caused: hangovers, indigestion,
poverty, heartbreak or the clap. In effect, the Epicurian desire was
to avoid extreme sensations, but these were the things Claudius forcefully sought
out through his actions -- which makes this philosophy very unlikely
to be his.
Epicurius' precursors, the Cyrenaics, allowed the pleasures to be more
active and they sought "gentle change" in their seeking of pleasure.
But this still falls short of the extremes needed to justify Claudius'
behavior. The gentle changes required care that one not fall in love or
get drunk or become superstitious. Their object being to command ones
pleasures. Once again Claudius shows no indication that he attempted to
control any of his pleasures; evidently, never in his life is moderation
of pleasures made an issue. On one occasion he released a knight, who
was on trial for seduction, telling the knight to restrain his passions;
then he weakened that idea by telling him to be more careful with his
passions in
future, adding: why should I care who your mistress might be ? This
censure, for what it was worth, was probably only used to fulfill the
conventions of a court proceeding, Claudius indicated as much by stating
that restraint of these passions is
of little or no interest to him.
The seeking of wisdom was a pleasure Claudius apparently
indulged in like a good Cyrenaic, but such pleasures were common
to many other philosophies. The main problem with believing that
Claudius was a follower of the Cyrenaic philosophy is that
Epicurianism stifled it to the point that it was quite unnoticeable
in the time of Claudius.
The Cynics, however, were influential in Nero's time in a minor way and the
Cynic Isidorus came to Rome during Claudius' time. However, several aspects
of the Cynic's world were adverse to Claudius' attitudes. First, they
preached an ascetic life even
more extreme than the Epicurian's. Claudius again shows no inclination
in this direction. The Cynics life was rather like what we call the
life of a bum, and Claudius never shied away from extravagance. Pleasure
was a good to the Cynic, but again, in
moderation -- although having sex with the first person one meets
on the street was their idea of a 'norm'. This unusual idea was indicative of the
Cynics rejection of all social norms, even if doing so hurts your life.
This is an idea which may have amused Nero in conversation, but Claudius
shows no indication of having entertained the idea of rejecting any
conventions. The fact that Claudius practiced all the social norms
available to him, and even sought to strengthen others, indicates
there was nothing Cynical about his practices.
The Stoics developed out of the Cynics, but on the surface they
seem very different. They accepted social norms, even believed in
the gods, which they turned into one God -- which was the 'universe' or
nature itself. Like the other three schools they desired to live in
moderation, again, very unlike Claudius. But what distinguishes the
Stoics is the degree of absolutism in their ideas. The other three
could be dogmatic, but they were
subjective and relativistic in many of their doctrines -- they lived
according to how they perceived nature. The Stoics were
much the same in all these respects, but they trumped up their
subjective base by assuming a faith in the ability of people to tap
into a universal "Reason" for everything. This allowed Seneca to be
certain about the things he did and said; because as long as he
believed that he was tapped in to Truth, anything he thought must be
part of the Reason of the universe.
Claudius could not have been a Stoic, not only because he avoided moderation,
but because he was full of doubts about truth and his own apprehension of
truth. Again and again evidence of this surfaces. In the surviving documents
of Claudius he
qualifies and relativizes much of what he does: "it is equitable,
to my mind"; "If you agree"; "as far as I recall" ; "If we follow Roman
authorities"; "if we follow Etruscan authorites"; "become hateful to our
state" (instead of evil). In Suetonius, Claudius is shown apologizing,
changing decisions, listening to the council of courtroom audiences,
wives and freedmen, and attending to every detail of both trials and his
histories in an attempt to get the facts right based on discussion and
argument. None of this is a similar to Seneca's arrogant belief that he
need look no further then his own soul for guidance.
Anticipating the objection that Claudius was doubtful because of a
character flaw, let me say that Claudius had a Sceptic's doubt: he was
not a coward in his ability to make
decisions. It would be true if he were flawed in that capacity, and his
doubts would seem to be irrelevant to a Sceptic's attitude. But he was strong --
even when he accepted other's recommendations, he did so boldly.
Secondly, he strongly disagreed with others, as with the Ostia harbour issue and
in his disagreement with Barbillus. He could stand against others without
doubting himself.
Claudius is quite contrary to a coward, or a Stoic. He asked for and
accepted the advice of others to facilitate his own judgment and expected
what was offered to be of the highest honesty to facilitate his need to
find relative truths.
The example which best illustrates this, is his statement, just before a
trial was about to commence, that he would "decide in favour of the party
which has told the truth". An idea, which, because it was not policy and
was probably used just once, might indicate his frustration with the court
tricks of lawyers that he despised. He loved the truth, but was aware of
how difficult it was to obtain, unlike Seneca, and unlike any Stoic.
Claudius now begins to resemble the most relativistic philosophies: the
Sophists and the Sceptics. The Sophists had been subsumed by the rhetoricians
over the centuries down to the Julio-Claudian period. By then the teaching of
rhetoric was a standard practice, so Claudius would likely have been familiar
with it. But, by his time, it was stripped of many of its philosophical implications in
favour of the practical uses of rhetoric. To find
substantial guidance would require a meatier school -- the Sceptics -- and Cicero
seems to have provided it.
A comparison of the emperor and the sceptics shows either an influence on
Claudius or an ingrained sympathy. Readers of Cicero complained
to him that his philosophy was unclear because he refused to
write on it directly. He counters and rebukes them for not using
their own judgment.
Claudius, also never indicated his philosophy directly, perhaps for the
same reason. He expected the Senate to think for itself.
Cicero believed, as did most Sceptics, that truth was primary, but that
many ideas have different possible answers.
Claudius made a fine point of discerning the truth while in court through
the exercise of the spirit of the law; and his flexibility and his
cognizance of his own mistakes while presiding indicates that Claudius
was
in harmony with Cicero's Sceptical bent.
Cicero once defended his own right to be inconsistent and, in effect,
he was defending Claudius' own inconsistencies, which now seem like
deliberated inconsistencies not like those of an idiot.
Cicero claimed friendship was defined by mutual service and Claudius'
life long friendships were marked for their mutual services -- even
so far as the incident when Claudius cited a gesture of kindness,
the glass of water incident, when rewarding a citizenship.
Cicero said he was, himself, kind, but that for reasons of state he
assumed severe attitudes, and Claudius does
so likewise in the punishment of Gaius' assassins. Cicero
considered glory the greatest reward and, according to Suetonius,
Claudius' invasion of Britain shows many indications of being motivated
by such a reward.
Finally, Cicero was quite fascinated by tradition, and his interest in
the unfashionable Scepticism was indicative of an antiquarianism.
Claudius was not only an antiquarian,
because of his taste for historical precedent, but he also had a
taste for the present. As Claudius and Cicero lived in different presents
this is where the two must part company in some ways.
Suetonius says: "Claudius not only revived obsolescent traditions but
invented new ones". As a Sceptic
Claudius would not object to conventions; that he would revive
and create many new ones would also be consistent with a Sceptic's need
to fulfill practical needs.
To carry out practical needs, one rates the chances of something being
true, or useful, or being possible to carry out. This probability
factored in a Sceptic's world view would also allow anything to be considered
a possible addition to a convention if it fulfills his practical needs,
as in this case with the needs of an Emperor.
What Claudius did with his innovations was calculate his chances according
to the practical needs of an Empire. This also paralleled his life long
fascination with games from dice to the gladiators. These ideas came
together when he became Emperor.
Claudius invented new letters, new paper, made a new harbour, a
new grain system, he reformed and replaced many institutions
and carried out wars and an innovative legal system.
To do all this a Sceptic would calculate the chances for success of a
project and hope for the best. Claudius would doubt the truth of a
decision but still make it -- so his choice must have seemed to be a
gamble to him. At the same time Claudius played and watched popular
games with avid attention and contemplation, even writing a book on
the subject of playing alea (dice) well. Graves disparaged this by
saying it was a book on how to win at dice. Given how game theory
today does the same thing and wins wars it is hardly laughable.
The combination of the two sides of his life the personal and the
regal game playing is inevitable when it is the mind of one individual
ruler we are talking about.
Granted, it is a matter of speculation, but Claudius seems to
have adopted Scepticism and added some innovations of his own
stemming from the necessity of making calculations of probability
in practical life, and combining this need with the obvious enjoyment
he felt when playing and watching games of chance.
This is hard to demonstrate through his actions in any conclusive way,
but his ironic and unsafe disregard for
conventions -- for example, in his needless revival of the
convention of the Secular Games against the convention for its proper
revival -- indicates an overall need to incorporate games into his public
life, even when the public has no specific need for them. His judicial
innovations and creativness also indicates a desire to take chances where
chances are not required by the conventions .
But even if the above innovations were definitely not required by
convention or by the state, his
gambling with public policy may have contributed to his popularity and
his later divine status, because the risks made their success seem more
important. Something which he may not have been able to calculate as an
ordinary Sceptic, but may have played for as an idiosyncratic Emperor.
Part II
Regarding the specifics of the dialogue, I will only make a
few points. I chose this period in Claudius' life in order to create a
context where he is still a fairly normal citizen and can be
conversed with without all the verbal regalia of an Emperor.
It also happens that Seneca was becoming prominent at this
time and had some noted trouble with Caligula. Seneca was
strengthened in his Stoic convictions by this trouble and
a note of fanaticism should come through as a result.
Messalina was quite young in 40 AD, but old enough to have an
opinion and Herod was a friend of both Caligula and Claudius,
and could facilitate a contest between Seneca and Claudius.
I took most of the characterizations of these two minor figures
from Graves.
Caligula's desire to cheat at dice lent itself well to a
comparison with Claudius' book on dice. It is a comparison
which became crucial to me, and so I made the situation
revolve around this clash of ideas.
The kitchen location was appropriate and logical for Claudius
because of his professed love for food and
because there is no evidence he feared tampered food. Compared
to the other emperors, he was seemingly more afraid of overt
assassination , but not very afraid of
covert poisoning, a contradiction which I resolved by assuming he
would have hung around the palace kitchens and befriended the
slaves in much the same way he befriended prostitutes and
freemen. Through these friendships the slaves might save his life
by warning him of danger, and he might have felt comfortable
there.
The character of Seneca speaks in an uncharacteristically stilted
way, frankly because I couldn't imitate his style while explaining
his philosophy. I emphasized Seneca's absolutism more then Seneca
does in his writings, because it is what is most
objectionable to Claudius' philosophical doubt. The documents
from Claudius' reign show a distinct relativism and yet a strength
of conviction which can only be explained as philosophical doubt.
I leave the rest to the imagination. There is no point is explaining
everything, or I need not have bothered making my
arguments through a dialogue.
GRH
continue to dialogue The Lawmakers
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