1: The Palatine: the reception wing of Caligula’s
palace
Messalina: Please, let’s not go in. If Gaius is playing
dice tonight, we may escape without being raped or hands being cut off, but we
will certainly be ruined financially by his cheating .
Claudius: Here comes Herod -- and Seneca is close behind.
Let’s see whether they’ll heed the Emperor’s summons. Herod, it’s to be an
evening of dice.
Herod: Such dread I’m witnessing from the two of you!
I’m not greatly worried. I have taken precautions against such an invitation
Claudius. Even if he cheats Judaea’s treasure away from me, I have secreted
enough wealth in Arabia to buy it back. I’m ready for bootikins. Let’s be off.
Messalina: No, Herod! Claudius and I have no such
recourse. My dear husband, don’t you think we should hide from Gaius tonight?
Remember how often it’s a greater mistake to do what he says as it is not to do
what he says. He is so perfectly unpredictable it‘s as
equally dangerous to obey a summons as it is to disobey.
Seneca: If I may add, I would very much like to follow
the Lady Messalina’s advice. My life was already forfeited by the emperor, but
as I was reported to be dying of consumption several months ago he
has spared me in hopes I would die abandoned and ignored. Unfortunately, I
only had influenza, and although I’m deathly thin , I will
seem quite a disappointment in the eyes of our pubescent father. I don’t think
I can act the consumptive very convincingly tonight.
Claudius: Well, Herod, my Messalina has made a very good
argument against gambling with my nephew tonight. And Seneca will certainly not
be risking his life but offering it. I suggest we retire to the palace kitchen.
The kitchen slaves and I have an understanding. No
slave in that division will betray our hiding spot.
Seneca: Thank you Claudius.
Herod: I knew it would be an interesting night.
II
All four are now in the kitchen in the palace
Claudius: I remember that Augustus, during his final days, would
irregularly come down here to taste the food as it was being made hoping to
taste it before it could be doctored. The fresh figs were very boring and he
felt the need for variety now and then. After all what is more fearful, Livia’s
poisons, or living without sweetmeats? I remember it was here also where his
final words where spoken, he asked for a mirror to look at himself, quite
uncharacteristically, and he said, “Have I played my part in this farce of life
creditably enough”? If only Gaius could act this uncharacteristically.
FThen again contradiction is his character. Perhaps he is attempting to
personify Farce more than he is trying to play Jupiter.
Seneca: Isn’t Farce the same as God by the verdict
of most men? But there is a reason for everything, for reason is
according to nature. Even Caligula’s madness and his
injustice. The universe is reason itself, and our fate, all our fates, is the
glimpse of that reason; and though man’s free will is the cause of evil, in the
long view, the universe will turn all evils to good ends.
Herod: And just as the good ends arrive, we die. I
prefer not to be disappointed by fate.
Seneca: Our souls will outlive our bodies and we will see
the ends for which we have suffered.
Claudius: And see them again and again forever, the immortal soul in the endlessly recurring play. In the Stoic view, which our friend is elaborating, our souls are immortal but the universe repeats the same script again and again. Could not the injustices come out in the rewrites Seneca?
Seneca: Reason is perfect, though everything changes
but good is meaningless without evil, so
the evil exists to make the good exist .
Messalina: Has any good been made to exist by evil?
Seneca: Now you phrase it differently from what I
meant. Good is an absolute property of virtuous behavior, there are no degrees
of good. Virtue is a will in agreement with nature; to do less
is evil. Evil does not create good, but one without the other
is logically impossible.
Claudius: Seneca, my friend, you forgot to add that a
virtuous will is free while others are determined.
Seneca: Yes, that is absolutely true. The virtuous man
determines his actions by reason while the world temps and suggests and forces
and so determines the actions of the all the others.
Claudius: Then is a will that is in agreement with nature
“free”, as you say, when to be in agreement it must be in line with nature, and
identical to every other virtuous will, while the non-virtuous
man will be found in agreement with nothing and may think anything he desires?
Seneca: Yes, if it is remembered
that the anything he can think which is not virtue will give him only one
result, the prison of unhappiness.
Herod: Well Plato was wrong after all. Dialectics can
force a man to admit agreement and yet not gain knowledge. I suggest a more
adequate contest of wits. Claudius versus Seneca. The son of a great warrior
versus the son of a great rhetorician. I will stand in as Caesar in judgment,
which may not be fair, but that is the will of nature. The topic is justice and
the question is “Where is justice at this time in history?”
III
Herod: before you begin to argue over points to which
you already agree I suggest you try to come to some common ground. The weapons
are philosophical so may I suggest you are both lovers of wisdom.
Seneca: Yes indeed.
Claudius: A lover a truth, I’d prefer. Truth regarding
the universe, or Nature, whatever you wish.
Seneca: This ground is common to my own.
To live according to what Nature dictates, not what convention stumbles upon.
Claudius: To conform to nature is enough. I don’t think
nature dictates, but to conform to what nature suggests, seems to be the more
practical way to discover relevant truths.
Herod: And both of you believe there is in truth
something called justice?
Seneca: Justice is a property of the mind, one of the
elements of virtue. All evil or good actions can change in
relation to their situation, but virtue alone is an absolute property of the
mind, so Justice is an absolute. One must have blind faith in virtue
.
Claudius: I accept justice exists but in quite dissimilar
terms. Justice is a convention of human society. I
also believe that all evil and good changes in relation to the situation,
however, there is no evidence that virtue and so justice is a property of the
mind and so I have no kind of faith to offer, much less
blind faith.
Herod: very good. The battle is about to commence.
Messalina: I bet the honourable Seneca ten thousand
sesterses that my husband is the closest to the truth.
Seneca: I’m not going to squander the money I saved
tonight while this pseudo-Caligula, Herod, is the presiding judge.
Messalina: I have such faith in my husband’s position that
I will let you decide if you have won the bet or not.
Seneca: Agreed.
IV
Herod: You may begin, Seneca.
Seneca: Socrates says in the Republic that the just man
is always happy and the unjust miserable. So with Socrates, the
happiest of men, it is the natural way to begin, especially as we hide from one
of the most unjust and so most miserable of men, Caligula. Caligula is all the
proof one needs that it is madness to choose evil over good for the simple
reason that one can never be happy doing evil. Man is innately
good and kind and all nature is reason incarnate.
That is why to act adverse to nature is always irrational and so it
is madness. Further, what is according to reason is also according to nature
and so whatever is reasonable is good as it is as solid and everlasting as the
universe itself. So reason is unchangeable and all good men’s
use of reason is identical, which proves it. Reason is the most
powerful force in the universe and will subdue any evil. Reason
is quite literally God. Of the four natures that live, animal, vegetable, human
and God, the latter two are the ones that use reason and
understand everything is placed here to serve us. When we use reason we are
only doing what the universe was designed to do, we are discovering how
everything is to serve man, as directed by the single divine nature. But while
the divine is reason, man has direct access to that same pure reason through a
cognitive impression which needs no outside corroboration. To attain the happy
life one need not look further than ones own mind,
for that’s where reason and happiness resides. When one looks
within, all reason is there and it is the same for all good men, and each good
man uses his cognitive impressions of reason to conform to nature and this act
of conforming to nature is virtue, the happy life. The reverse is insanity,
disease of the mind and evil. Virtue is absolute, without degrees. Everything
else is merely relative. Justice is only one aspect of virtue. The just will
act exactly according to reason, without the need to judge something based on
an action’s consequences, and it does not matter if the act is desired by
others or praised by others, all that matters is that the act be according to
reason and it will give others happiness. Justice is a virtue which gives
others happiness.
Claudius: Whether they know it or not?
Seneca: Yes, or course.
Herod: And where is justice today? as that is our
question presently.
Seneca: Where it has always been, in the mind of good
men.
V
Herod: So Claudius, what is your understanding of the
question?
Claudius: Well, as my learned colleague, referred to the
sage, Socrates, I will begin by asking Seneca what was the result of Plato’s Lysis
-- what did Socrates conclude?
Seneca: I don’t think he concluded in any form.
Claudius: Yes, but when looked at another way he concluded
that there is no conclusion and we should argue sometimes only to
exercise our minds. I’m aware of your dislike of such a position, but as you
are the son of a rhetorician I think you may forgive my impertinence. So
while I will make certain statements which appear conclusive I will only be
exercising an idea or two. My proclivity has always been Ciceronian
, and rather the unfashionable side of his eclecticism, the
sceptical side. As such, I’m always reminding myself of that great commotion
Cicero writes about regarding Carneades visit to Rome. The
subject of Carneades lectures was justice. On one day he had one thesis and on
the following day he employed its opposite. While the sophistry of it rankles
the Socratic mind, it is perhaps no injustice that Socrates spiritually gave birth to the
movement which Carneades was the inheritor, the Academy of Athens.
Seneca: I don’t think we can blame Socrates for
the faults of his usurpers. His doubt in himself and in knowledge was far from
the sceptic’s uncertainty.
Claudius: Perhaps, but not only the Academy, but every
philosophy today owes something to him. For the sceptics, Socrates faining
ignorance was accepted as a viable and logical first principle. By acting as
one humbled by ignorance one begins to see one’s own ignorance simply by
reasoning through that point of view. It was Arcesilaus who said we
should refrain from assenting to any position because it could be wrong. But
Carneades showed that being wrong at least once during an argument may be
necessary. It is not as though one can know one will be wrong, but if one takes
both sides of an argument there is a good chance at least one side will be
mistaken. Often, as it seemed to the audience during Carneades lectures, both
sides seemed to be correct and it was not possible for both to be equally
correct. It was a matter of probability which informed them as to which seemed the truer.
I would add that if the point of views be given equal weight, often the
arguments have equal weight and any estimate of probability of truth is
superfluous. The reason being that both can be equally true given their
respective points of view. What then would cause one
point of view to be acceptable over another? Why do I cheer for the Blues over
the Greens (the chariot teams)? Oh, I suppose, I grew up wanting to emulate
Augustus, or probably the Blues have had many skilled charioteers, but however
I developed my point of view I use it to the detriment of the Greens. To be
fair I should not take any side, but then again what am I doing at the races?
If all judgment is based on probability, but all estimates of probability
depend on point of view, and all points of view are equal and the choice is
arbitrary, what do I do between now and eternity? I say I should go to the
races and have a good time.
Messalina: How can you defeat that Seneca?
Seneca: Oh? Was that an argument?
Herod: Have you finished your round Claudius?
Claudius: I’m sorry I should have answered the question
about justice. At the beginning I acknowledged truth as of primary importance.
Well justice cannot exist without the possibility of correct and infallible
judgment. The stoics claim a cognitive impression gives
men, some men, this ability. Well it is a claim of faith as Seneca admitted
earlier, not a claim of reason as Seneca claimed for all wise men. If this act
of faith in a cognitive impression is the first principal of reason, then
judgment may as well be a game, for even as an arrow will always fly straight
and true even from the bow of a blind man, judgment of truth will always sound
convincing from the mouth of a convinced man.
Seneca: I see you take issue with the good man’s direct
impression of truth, reason, God, the all. It is true that it takes effort to
conform to the impression given in the soul. But it is there.
Claudius: You said all good men will have identical
judgments. I agree that this should be the case if there was this cognitive
impression in the soul. I wonder if you have seen two people with identical
judgments in your career? Two people who are so a like in judgment that to know
one’s opinion is to know the other?
Seneca: Of course I haven’t. I can’t know the mind of a
particular man so well that I can say he matches another man. I said this
belief is a requirement of faith.
Claudius: Tell me then, what is the difference between a
judgment based on faith and one based on sport? They are both blind to the
truth, is that not so?
Seneca: Perhaps. But sport is useless and anything
useless has no value, whether it is the races or whether it is learning how to
argue a useless proposition.
Claudius: But isn’t use and value determined after use and
value are offered? Let’s say that the judgment of a citizen regarding a crime
is in our hands. Before a judgment is made we cannot know who did the crime --
we cannot know the value of that decision -- we have not judged. So we think
for a moment, he is guilty because he was caught with the merchandise. Then we
consider if he is innocent, because we suddenly realize that the man who
was the victim owed the guilty man more than the stolen property was worth. We go back and
forth from point of view to point of view while the evidence stays exactly the
same as it was when we had no opinion. It is possible that the issue should
not be decided -- not that day, nor any day, because new evidence may be
forthcoming -- but the rules of justice, the courtroom and of the state require
s you to make a judgment within a certain time frame. Why should that be when the
truth is far from certain and not all the evidence is available? Because the
court is designed to make winners and losers. Any judgment needs to be made
whether it is wrong or right. So in your mind you take one side and calculate
how this will weigh on your career, or how it effects the victim’s family, or
any number of other values and uses. Then you take the other side and do new
calculations. By the time the court returns to await your final ruling, the
public judgment will not be based on the scales of truth strictly regarding the
case and evidence, because that is impossible, and really quite irrelevant, but
on what was available to the court, good or bad. A judgment was tried on for
size -- for use and value to one’s own mind -- and the side that was calculated
the most useful and valuable during the casual, informal judgment of the mind
was the side that won. Values and uses were determined after a judgment was
tried on for size -- that doesn’t sound very grand, does it? Once the people
hear the verdict the whole exercise starts again in their minds as it did in
the one mind of the judge. What does this mean to the state? Will there be new
evidence contradicting the decision? Will the judge need to suppress the new
evidence to avoid embarrassment? Eventually a reason to change the verdict
comes to light and the supporters of the verdict don’t believe it because they
have used the first verdict to their advantage and it has become valuable to
them. These people don’t even know why it is so valuable or what use they are
making out of it. But they have decided on the verdict, used it and valued it a
certain way. And what did it win in the long run? Nothing more then a game
wins. A pittance, one’s own survival often. But if we look at the trial itself,
and accept the limited scope of its point of view, for a moment we feel
something, for moment we are alive, for a moment the judgment seems right, we
have accomplished something. The next moment something changes and it doesn’t
feel right so we change our minds and condemn the judgment, even if it was our
own. For a moment the people feel something when they hear the
verdict and they may hate it. They do not know if the verdict will benefit them
in the future, but they use the judgment. Even if each of us changes his mind,
for a moment at least, one may have been able to reward oneself by feeling
greater than Chilo of Sparta -- for the moment is all we are.
Seneca: Remember the twenty thousand spectator’s who
died at the games during Tiberius reign when the stands collapsed?
They certainly lived for the sporting moment.
Claudius: And remember Titus Sabinas won a quaestorship
based on an earlier drinking competition, he certainly turned a
momentary sport into something useful.
Seneca: Are you trying to turn the evil of drunkenness
into a good?
Claudius: I’m turning games into something potentiality
useful. In both our cited cases, fate was tested for only a limited goal and in
both cases fate determined an extreme result, and how is that different from
any activity?
Seneca: Those activities were useless in themselves.
VI
Claudius: Nothing is isolated in the Universe, you’ve
already said everything is one with God and Reason. Games work within that.
What I described in terms of court actions, can be said of those useless sport
and learning exercises. Think of the Blues and Greens. By supporting the Greens
during Tiberius’ reign you may find it useless politically, but you may find
friendship amongst the team supporters, your friendship could lead to work or
to marriage. And think of the plebeian supporters of the Blues, you can feel
the same as an Emperor who supports the Blues -- like a winner some times, even
when nothing else in your life makes you very happy. That feeling might be useful in
itself. You see, when you play something, you make a judgment regarding a
seemingly useless and valueless activity and the uses and values never seem to
end. Today of course, your career advancement under my nephew is improved if
you are a Green supporter. By the way, I would suspect that the Green
supporters agree far more frequently on issues of judgment than do the stoic
sages, which makes one wonder how the stoics can believe that all virtuous men
think exactly a like, unless sporting is the virtue they mean.
Seneca: That is absurd!
Claudius: Very well, it is the conventions of one’s
association, from the state to family conventions, where a standard of reason
may be found: not in the mind, or in a cognitive impression, but in the mere
decision to take a side and to try to use it and value it to the best of one’s
ability to rationalize. Your stoical everlasting life, and the recurring
script of fate, Seneca, are not values I can use when my nature, and all of
fate, in all its manifestations, have scripted that man can only be alive when
playing a game.
Seneca: I would agree that men do some of what you say,
but only because that is the best way to deal with fate.
Eventually, the reason for events becomes clear if we learn to accept the will
of the universe, but it is not rationalization, but reason which we accept. As
regarding whether justice is like a game, or is a game, you could not be more
mistaken. Games whether in the arena or among the liberal arts are useless
and valueless, no matter where they lead as only the study
of the good arts of philosophy will lead to virtue, which is the only value.
Justice therefore could not be a game. As
regarding “points of view”, I already agreed that sophistry can demonstrate the
relative nature of any proposition, and how all sides may be argued equally
well, that is why reason must be accessed directly by each good man. Otherwise
if one acquires the standards of justice from societal convention one may
become like Caligula or Tiberius, without a guide because they themselves
manifested societal convention.
Claudius: No, they overrided it, they didn’t manifest it.
I agree they violated convention; I never claimed conventions maintain control
of their members, or that there is one convention and so one form of justice.
As weak as this situation sounds, justice is only a convention, not a universal
law. Certainly, your idea of justice has no greater power of enforcement. From
my point of view it is also certain that the nature these two tyrants
manifested itself in the quality of their games. Even when issues of state were
regarded they acted within a game playing mode, as when Tiberius thought it
worthy to emulated Priam in outliving all his relatives, but in his case by
murdering us; and also instituting a minister of pleasures, and
only condescending to direct the nation himself when it became more interesting
than his nymphonum. Likewise there is Caligula -- he signs execution lists
calling it the clearing of his accounts, and he consistently repeats
variations of “damning if they do and damning if they don’t”, as when he freed
some hostages in Germany and told them to go home, then after dinner he set out
to recapture them. You see, unlike you, I think Tiberius was unhappy
, and Caligula was (and is) unhappy, not because they lacked
virtues, but because they did not know how to play games. They both cheated at
games so much that as their power grew their games became less challenging and
so less rewarding to win. They grew desperate to maintain interest in their
games because they could count on winning every time, and you can’t enjoy a
game that you know you’ll win. Caligula quite seriously despairs that our age
is prosperous and secure, and without disasters and invasions. He
despairs because those are the type of games he thinks are challenging to him.
He spends all his time thinking up new extravagances and even contemplates
ordering legion against legion to restore his interest in warfare.
It is not because he is mad, though he is mad, that he plays these
games, it is because that is what all humans do, and like a man who is emperor
of a prison cell, he has begun to run out of games to play. He is desperate to
be human, that is all that Caligula’s game playing means . . . he wants to be
human. I believe that as long as one plays games within the conventional rules
one can find the games pleasurable. To cheat at games is to rob oneself, not of
the “Reason” contained in human nature, but of the emotions
contained in human nature. To play a game according to the conventional rules
is what justice is. Justice is not enforceable if there is power which can
override it, but, then again, the human emotions cannot reward actions which
are too easily accomplished, and so some kind of justice enforces itself
through the emotions. The book I wrote was on how to play dice well
, it was not on how to win at dice, for this very reason and on
this very subject. I think happiness and justice is derived from a game played
honestly and so justly.
Messalina: Oh well, that was disappointing Claudius. I
should have read your book before I placed my bet.
Herod: Are you offering to forfeit your wager to Seneca
my Lady?
Messalina: Well I thought it was certain that I lost the
bet. Not that you didn’t speak wonderfully my dear Claudius, only that it
didn’t make sense at the end. Why should the emotions not work if one cheated
and fixed everything? I arrange the household so nothing unexpected happens; I
don’t want to find bed bugs in the mattress, that doesn’t interest me. I want a
regular income and trustworthy staff. I don’t want prices to change from day to
day. These things make me calm and happy.
Claudius: But only because its a relief from the previous
confusions of ones life. I agree that these and economic factors should remain
assured. But once the steady reliability of the household seems
assured you will look for further confusions to play with and sort out, whether
it is learning Greek or patronizing an artist. The easier it gets for you the
further a field you must go to maintain the sense of challenge.
Messalina: Oh, well.
VII
Herod: How do you respond Seneca? Do you concede, or do
you claim victory? The Lady Messalina seems to be willing to concede to you.
Seneca: I claim victory of course. It’s ridiculous to
think that the universe is without reason, or that man has no purpose. His
first idea that truth is ultimately unattainable undercuts every assertion
Claudius has made since. Of course I win.
Herod: Then you accept his assertion on truth yourself?
Otherwise you can’t use it to argue with and to undercut his use of it.
Seneca: No, I don’t accept it. Let him stand on it. For
my own position, truth is absolute, reason is absolute, the universe is
absolute, and I know it because virtue is absolute with everything. The
sophistry of Claudius will not change nature, so I will not change my faith in
it.
Herod: Well Claudius, the contest was to decide the
best argument, but as usual it was only to clarify each of our beliefs. I say
that you won, but only because I already believed it, perhaps someday I may
grow out of it, but at present I declare you the winner of this contest. Here’s
a snatch of bay leaves just for the purpose. I’ll throw them over your head,
but not in triumph, no, only as preparation for Gaius cooking you. In fact,
serving us all for dinner may be the only way to hide. On second thought, let’s
just slink away into the night and hope for the best. What do you say?
They all agree and leave the kitchen.
The End